Расширенное сознание и каузальный статус деятелей Сергей Левин



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Сергей Лев и н
241
Библиография
Clark А, Chalmers D. The Extended Mind // Analysis. 1998. № 1. P. 7–19.
Dennett D. Freedom Evolves. N.Y.: Viking Books. 2003.
Dworkin R. Justice for Hedgehogs. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University
Press, 2011.
Haley K. J., Fessler D. M. T. Nobody’s Watching? Subtle Cues Affect Generosity in an
Anonymous Economic Game // Evolution and Human Behavior. 2005.
Vol. 26. P. 245–256.
Honderich T. How Free Are You? N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1993.
Kane R. The Significance of Free Will. N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1996.
Mele A. R. Free: Why Science Hasn’t Disproved Free Will. N.Y.: Oxford University
Press, 2014.
Van Inwagen P. An Essay on Free Will. Oxford,
UK
: Clarendon Press, 1983.
Van Inwagen P. The Incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism // Philosophical
Studies. 1975. Vol. 27. № 3. P. 185–199.
Секацкая М. А. Моральная ответственность без свободы воли. Аргумент в пользу натуралистической этики // Вопросы философии. 2014. № 10. С. 151–161.
Секацкая М. А. Этические идеалы, логические ограничения и проблема свободы Вопросы философии. 2012. № 2. СЛОГ ОСТОМ THE AGENT
Sergei Levin. Lecturer, St. Petersburg School of Social Sciences and Humanities,
Department of Sociology, National Research University Higher School of Economics
(
HSE
). Address: 55 Sedova str., 192171 St. Petersburg, Russia. E-mail: slevin@hse.ru.
Keywords: free will; extended mind; causality; determinism; compatibilism.
In this article, it is shown that the one of the basic premises of the free will debates is challenged by the extended mind hypothesis. The premise is that people’s actions are universally determined or undetermined by their previous states. In this article, the causal determinacy or indeterminacy of the behavior of an agent is called “causal sta- tus.” Agents whose behavior has just one possible future have determined causal sta- tus, while agents whose behavior may vary in the future have undetermined causal status. The structure of the world or local determinism may govern an agent’s causal status. It is claimed that according to extended mind hypothesis agents with different causal statuses may coexist in the world.
The extended mind hypothesis states that artifacts located outside of human bod- ies may perform cognitive functions and we must recognize them as parts of a human cognitive system. Those artifacts may be either determined or undetermined.
In both cases, according to the extended mind hypothesis, they are going to be parts of the human cognitive system. Therefore, with respect to cognitive functions per- formed by those artifacts, agents have different causal statuses. It is easy to imag- ine a situation in which various people use determined and undetermined devices simultaneously and are considered free in the same manner. If the presented argu- ments are valid, then the extended mind hypothesis and the assumption about the uniformity of causal states of free agents cannot both be true.
References
Clark А, Chalmers D. The Extended Mind. Analysis, 1998, no. 1, pp. 7–19.
Dennett D. Freedom Evolves, New York, Viking Books. 2003.
Dworkin R. Justice for Hedgehogs, Cambridge, Belknap Press of Harvard University
Press, 2011.
Haley K. J., Fessler D. M. T. Nobody’s Watching? Subtle Cues Affect Generosity in an
Anonymous Economic Game. Evolution and Human Behavior, 2005, vol. 26, pp. 245–256.
Honderich T. How Free Are You?, New York, Oxford University Press, 1993.
Kane R. The Significance of Free Will, New York, Oxford University Press, 1996.
Mele A. R. Free: Why Science Hasn’t Disproved Free Will, New York, Oxford Univer- sity Press, 2014.
Sekatskaia M. A. Eticheskie idealy, logicheskie ogranicheniia i problema svobody
[Ethical Ideals, Logical Limitations and the Problem of Freedom]. Voprosy
filosofii [Questions of Philosophy], 2012, no. 2, pp. 81–91.
Sekatskaia M. A. Moral’naia otvetstvennost’ bez svobody voli. Argument v pol’zu nat- uralisticheskoi etiki [Moral Responsibility in the Absence of Free Will. An
Argument for Naturalistic Ethics]. Voprosy filosofii [Questions of Philosophy],
2014, no. 10, pp. 151–161.
Van Inwagen P. An Essay on Free Will, Oxford,
UK
, Clarendon Press, 1983.
Van Inwagen P. The Incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism. Philosophical
Studies, 1975, vol. 27, no. 3, pp. 185–199.

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